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Interim interdict - Such moved by urgent application -Respondent raising a preliminary objection in which he argues that the matter should not be heard on urgent basis - Court finding that applicant has complied with all requirements in terms of Rule 6 (12) (b) of the Rules of Court - Consequently, Court dismissing respondent's preliminary objection and hearing application on urgent basis. A 426/2009 (Unreported) which applicant must satisfy in the field of unlawful competition and protection of one's right to confidential information regarding one's business and goodwill contained in restraint of trade agreement - Court finding that in instant case applicant's averments justify granting order for interim protection against respondent's continuing infringements in breach of respondent's obligation under the restraint of trade agreement, resulting in applicant's loss of business and applicant ought to have been explained in the founding affidavit and that the explanation therefor in the replying affidavit constitute new matter which must be struck out - Court observing that in deciding whether new matter has been introduced in a replying affidavit Court must consider the facts and circumstances of the particular case - In instant case Court finding that on the facts and in the circumstances the matter sought to be struck out does not constitute new matter properly so called and accordingly Court dismissing respondent's preliminary objection. 117 (1) (e) - Respondent contending at the threshold that on the interpretation of s 117 (1) (e) the Labour Court does not have jurisdiction to hear present application - Court considered the lexical meaning of each word used in the sentence of s.117 (1) (e) and, above all, the syntax of that sentence, and also took into account, as was necessary so to do, the long title of the Labour Act in order to arrive at the correct meaning of s.117 (1) (e) - Having pursued this logical and rudimentary approach to interpretation of statutes, Court holding that the Labour Court has jurisdiction to hear the present in interpreting a statutory provision, one must always consider the lexical (or, where applicable, the descriptive) meaning of each word used in the provision and, above all, the syntax of the phrase, clause or sentence under consideration and also take into account, where it is necessary so to do, the long title of the statute under consideration in order to arrive at the correct meaning of the provision in question.further that, the rule of practice that 'new matter' in a replying affidavit may not to be permitted should not be applied blindly and mechanically, without due regard to the facts and circumstances of the particular case. The applicant, represented by Mr. 3, a case, which, like the present, also concerned the matter of urgent enforcement of a restraint of trade clause in a contract of employment, I relied on what I had stated in the earlier case of 'In my opinion, the essence of rule 6 (12) of the Rules is, therefore, that in the exercise of his or her discretion, it is only in a deserving case that a Judge may dispense with the forms and service provided in the Rules.
2.1, 2.2 and 2.3), 3 and 4 of the notice of motion. In this regard it must be remembered that the circumstances that would render a matter urgent in one case may not reach that mark in another case: it all depends upon the facts and circumstances that are peculiar to the particular applicant has mentioned them briefly in the notice of motion and expanded on them in the founding affidavit a series of conduct on the part of the respondent that, according to the applicant, are in breach of the respondent's obligations under the service agreement entered into between the applicant and the respondent in September 2000.
The following is, therefore, worth noting at this stage of the enquiry, concerning the issue of 'urgency' (requirement (1)); that is to say, whether the applicant can prove the averments in due course is of no moment; whether the applicant has 'set out' those circumstances with sufficient particularity and clarity so as to be capable of eliciting a response from the respondent is of consequence.
In this regard, I am satisfied that the circumstances that the applicant has set out in its papers are not based on some vague and unsubstantial implications and suggestions: they are capable of eliciting response from the respondent, and they have. I pass to consider requirement (2); and in doing so, it is significant to note that in its papers, the applicant contends that the alleged breach of the restraint of trade clauses of the aforementioned service agreement has already begun and it is continuing and so the applicant has prayed the Court for protection in the interim from the loss of business and income which has been and will be occasioned by the infringements and continuing infringements on the part of the respondent of certain terms of the aforementioned service agreement.
In such a situation, it makes no sense to argue, as Mr.
Barnard does, that the applicant can be afforded substantial redress, in the form of damages, at the hearing in due course; and so, according to Mr.